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1A Dish Served Cold: Targeting Revenge in Revenge Pornography
Abstract:
The introduction of Section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, 
criminalising the disclosure of private sexual images, has been seen as a welcome 
step forward for curbing this abuse of privacy and the harmful effects it has 
on victims. However, while Section 33 sidesteps any reference to ‘revenge 
pornography’, as the phenomenon has been termed in popular vernacular, little 
attention has been paid to the way in which narratives of revenge implicitly 
underpin and imbue the new offence, particularly its specific intent requirement. 
We argue this has serious implications for the treatment of Section 33 offences in 
the courts and for sentencing. Drawing on cross-disciplinary conceptualisations of 
revenge, its recent criminal-legal history, and examples of media and parliamentary 
rhetoric, we claim that despite innumerable attempts to turn debate on disclosure of 
private sexual images towards consent, harm and privacy, there lurks within these 
discourses an assumption that the victim must have done something to deserve the 
treatment she received. Until the multiple harms of disclosure of private sexual 
images are recognised and explicit recommendations are made that scrutiny of 
victims’ behaviour should normally be inadmissible, we argue that the offence 
offers little in the way of redress.
2Introduction 
In 2015, Section 33(1) of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 made it an 
offence to disclose a private sexual photograph or film if the disclosure is made:
(a) without the consent of an individual who appears in the photograph or film, 
and
(b) with the intention of causing that individual distress.
The strengths and weaknesses of the new offence in terms of scope and reach have 
been well documented. Gillespie is particularly critical of the specific mens rea 
requirement that a perpetrator’s object is to cause distress,1 while McGlynn and 
Rackley, and Henry and Powell have argued that the focus on ‘revenge 
pornography’ fails to take into account other forms of ‘image-based sexual abuse.2 
Citron and Franks have also outlined in some detail potential justifications for 
criminal-legal intervention,3 and the definition of ‘pornography’ in the context of 
revenge pornography has been contested.4 However, little attention has yet been 
paid to the specifics of why the offence in England and Wales is narrow. Despite 
the fact that Section 33 makes no explicit mention of revenge, our contention is that 
socio-cultural scripts of revenge nevertheless underpin the debates that shaped the 
offence, and will inform the treatment of the offence in the courts. By engaging 
with the meanings attributed to revenge and its recent criminal-legal history, we 
1
 A Gillespie ‘“Trust Me, It’s Only for Me”: Revenge Porn’ and the Criminal Law’ (2015) Crim L 
Rev 866.
2
 C McGlynn and E Rackley ‘Image-Based Sexual Abuse’ (2017) Oxford J Legal Stud DOI: 
10.1093/ojls/gqw033; N Henry and A Powell ‘Sexual Violence in the Digital Age: The Scope and 
Limits of Criminal Law’ (2016) 25 Soc and Legal Stud 397.
3
 D K Citron and M A Franks ‘Criminalizing Revenge Porn’ (2014) 49 Wake Forest L Rev 345.
4
 Henry and Powell, above, n 2.
3address the question of why it is that revenge pornography above other forms of 
technology-facilitated sexual violence5 has so fervently captured the popular 
imagination, proven such effective tabloid fodder, and elicited more commentary, 
debate, and campaigning for criminalisation than other forms of gendered violence 
in recent years.6 We will argue that despite many attempts to turn the debate on 
revenge pornography towards consent, harm and privacy, it is the revenge narrative 
that proves to be the principal rhetoric that underpins justifications for 
criminalisation, the focus in calls for early reform of the law and sentencing 
guidelines, and the mainstay of media reporting.7 
The origins of the term revenge pornography can be traced back to media 
stories concerning Hunter Moore and the infamous ‘isanyoneup’ website. Hunter 
Moore became one of the first individuals prosecuted for the sharing of private 
sexual images without consent. While the offence for which Hunter Moore was 
eventually imprisoned amounted to identity theft8 and unauthorised access to a 
computer, the term ‘revenge pornography’, which emerged in his case, remained 
and has shaped media coverage since. In England and Wales one of the first widely 
publicised instances of revenge pornography concerned Tulisa Contostavlos 
(previously of N-Dubz fame). The incident predated the introduction of Section 33, 
5
 N Henry and A Powell ‘Embodied Harms: Gender, Shame, and Technology-Facilitated Sexual 
Violence’ (2015) 21 Violence Against Women 758. 
6
 The long-standing but comparatively underreported phenomenon of up-skirting, for example, has 
until recently been superseded – indeed eclipsed entirely – in the wake of the ‘discovery’ of revenge 
pornography. Over the last few months, a campaign was launched to target up-skirting in England 
and Wales via an amendment to S 67 Sexual Offences Act 2003, and it was raised for the first time 
in oral questions in the House of Commons on 5th September 2017 (HC Deb, 5 September 2017, vol 
628, col 12). However, no legislative action has yet been taken.
7
 While there are, of course, other ‘backstories’ that underpin the new offence, such as cyberbullying 
and cyberstalking, these are rarely foregrounded in either parliamentary debate on the construction 
of the offence or its reform, or in media reporting on the case law.
8
 ‘Revenge porn website operator Hunter Moore sentenced to 30 months in prison’, The Verge (3 
October 2015), see http://www.theverge.com/2015/12/3/9843038/hunter-moore-revenge-porn-is-
anyone-up-prison-sentence (accessed 3 November 2017).
4instead utilising civil litigation. However, the facts of the case are illustrative of 
most revenge porn cases; Tulisa’s ex-boyfriend posted the images following the 
breakup of their relationship mirroring many reported cases of revenge 
pornography. Thus, ‘revenge pornography’ may be a media constructed term, but 
we argue that it is this particular narrative, and set of gendered characterisations, 
that became the paradigmatic story around which the legality of disclosure of 
private sexual images was debated. 
The paradigmatic story of the revenge pornography scenario is thus as 
follows: a woman shares with her partner erotic images of herself, or permits those 
pictures to be taken. She then leaves her partner. Said ex-partner goes on to share 
these intimate and often explicit images, taken with consent, either on social media 
platforms or on specifically targeted revenge pornography websites, such as 
MyEx.com, and the now-defunct IsAnyoneUp, without consent. The image is 
sometimes discovered at this point, or worse, as a result of dissemination to other 
websites. In many cases, victims have reported harassment and stalking, the 
circulation of their private addresses and contact details online, and often retreat 
from public spaces on and offline as a result of this assault on their privacy, in 
addition to experiencing considerable distress.9 
There is also a parallel debate surrounding revenge motives in the context 
of ‘crimes of passion’, usually violence against women, and usually perpetrated by 
intimate partners when a relationship ends, or where there is suspicion of adultery. 
9
 For case studies, see Citron and Franks, above n 3; M Salter and T Crofts  'Responding to Revenge 
Porn: Challenges to Online Legal Impunity' in L Cormella and S Tarrant (eds) New Views on 
Pornography: Sexuality, Politics, and the Law (Praeger Press, Santa Barbara, CA: 2015) pp 233-
256.
5As Howe has documented,10 revenge as gender-based violence has previously 
emerged most frequently in cases of spousal homicide.11 Like Howe, we adopt the 
term ‘crime of passion’ to describe not merely an act of violence that takes place 
without premeditation, but to denote the context in which it takes place, and how 
this frames the way in which it is viewed as unpremeditated: romantic intimacy. We 
view revenge pornography, then, as a contemporary means of orchestrating ‘crimes 
of passion’, in which new technologies are weaponised against deviation from 
romantic virtue, usually against women. While there has been controversy over the 
term ‘pornography’ being attached to these images,12 we argue that the 
phenomenon represents the shaping of an explicit image to the terms of the 
pornographic specifically to exact revenge on the party depicted, and thus use the 
term ‘revenge pornography’ throughout this piece. Within the relevant sections 
discussing the offence the phrase ‘disclosure of private sexual images’ is used to 
distinguish the letter of the law from popular parlance.
We begin by examining attempts to conceptualise revenge to better 
understand what is at stake in the debates about the need for the offence, and the 
way in which it is being operationalized, and then provide a legal backdrop that 
outlines the debates surrounding the introduction of the new offence. We then trace 
how revenge has been treated historically in English criminal law, specifically in 
the context of ‘crimes of passion’. We argue that the legal response to ‘crimes of 
passion’ has crucial implications for revenge pornography cases, and that both 
seemingly individualise violence against women, reimagining that violence as an 
10
 A Howe ‘Provoking Polemic – Provoked Killings and the Ethical Paradoxes of the Postmodern 
Feminist Condition’ (2002) 10 Feminist Legal Stud 39; A Howe ‘“Red Mist” Homicide: Sexual 
Infidelity and the English Law of Murder (Glossing Titus Andronicus)’ (2013) 33 LS 407.
11
 See, for example, R v Clinton, Parker and Evans [2012] Crim 2.
12
 Henry and Powell, above n 2.
6act of revenge with justificatory or excusatory qualities that limit wrongfulness. 
This leads to a discussion about our concerns that revenge may be construed 
implicitly as the underlying rationale for Section 33’s requirement of specific intent. 
Specifically, without the prosecution team’s provision of a backstory, where the 
actions of the victim and what she did to ‘deserve’ the actions of the perpetrator are 
called into question, we suggest that a finding of intention to cause distress is likely 
to be difficult. Finally, we argue that the terms of the original debates over 
criminalisation in Parliament and subsequent attempts to reform the offence, and 
current sentencing guidelines, are also reliant on revenge motives to determine the 
shape of the offence and the terms of sentence. Ultimately, we argue that the offence 
will remain limited until there is closer attention paid to the harms revenge 
pornography may cause, and debate is refocused on the broader implications of 
‘disclosing private sexual photographs and films with intent to cause distress’, 
rather than the paradigmatic narrative that accompanies discussions of ‘revenge 
pornography’, and make some practical recommendations for reform. 
Conceptualising Revenge 
While doubt has been cast over the extent to which revenge pornography 
can legitimately be considered a ‘new’ phenomenon,13 narratives of revenge, which 
proved particularly persuasive in arguments for criminalisation within media 
rhetoric and Parliament, are by no means new. As we have noted, Section 33 does 
not itself hinge on revenge as a form of specific intent. Nevertheless, the 
disclosure of private sexual imagery has continually been constructed in popular 
13
 S H Scheller ‘A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Words: The Legal Implications of Revenge Porn’ 
(2014) 93 North Carolina L Rev 551.
7discourse as an act of revenge in response to the actions of the victim prior to the 
disclosure of the image. Calls for criminalisation were often reliant on this 
narrative to make a persuasive case for new legislation.14 The need to understand 
why someone might intend to cause distress through disclosure of sexual images 
has bled through into official discourses that do have a purchase on reform of the 
law and sentencing. With this in mind, it is important to consider precisely what 
are meant by revenge motivations, and what this can tell us about the potential 
problems with hinging the offence on specific intent to cause distress. 
In punishment theory, most retributivists steer well clear of revenge, and 
tend to assert that it has no role to play in contemporary criminal law.15 
Nevertheless, historically, revenge has often been positioned as precisely the target 
of retributive justice. Histories of revenge tend to take one of two trajectories. On 
the one hand, legal historians argue that the cyclical terror of blood revenge died 
naturally as law evolved, replacing a thirst for vengeance first with compensatory 
‘pounds of flesh’, and then the rule of law.16 In this account, revenge is positioned 
as a culturally and historically primitive response to feeling that one has been 
wronged, which eventually suffered from ‘obsolescence and inadaptability’.17 An 
14
 See for example, M A Franks and D Citron, ‘It’s simple: Criminalise revenge porn, or let men 
punish women they don’t like’ The Guardian 17 April 2014, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/17/revenge-porn-must-be-criminalized-
laws (accessed 1 March 2018).
15
 For perhaps the most well-known attempt to distinguish revenge and retribution, see R Nozick 
Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). More recently, 
scholars such as G Fletcher (Rethinking Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000)) and Moore (Placing Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997)) have provided further justification for distinguishing the two concepts. However, see T 
Rosenbaum’s Payback: The Case for Revenge (London: University of Chicago Press, 2013) for a 
defence of revenge as an operative principle in the criminal justice system and indeed, drawing on 
the example of ‘crimes of passion’, an argument that it already plays a significant role.
16
 This perspective emerged in 19th century legal historical works. See, for example, F Pollock and 
F W Maitland History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I (2nd edition, Liberty Fund Inc, 
2009). 
17
 W Miller ‘Clint Eastwood and Equity: Popular Culture’s Theory of Revenge’ in A Sarat and T 
Kearns (eds) Law in the Domains of Culture (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998) 
p 161. 
8anathema to the development of the rule of law, to succumb to vengeful urges in 
the present is suggestive of a human regressiveness that must be quashed at all costs. 
On the other hand, contractarian political theorists argue that it is not so 
simple as revenge ‘dying out’ with the miraculous evolution of human progress; 
rather, the urge for revenge exists just as it always did, but must be consciously, 
continually defeated, suppressed and punished by more measured forms of state-
sanctioned retribution. 18  Furthermore, this function of law is deemed necessary 
precisely to ‘contain and metabolize’19 the revenge impulse at a socio-cultural level. 
Schoenfield’s essay on the necessity of retribution in law suggests that if people 
lose faith in law’s ability to deliver justice, they will be drawn into escalating 
patterns of personal revenge.20 Thus, the law is seen in this more utilitarian purview 
as not merely punishing vengeful acts, but actively preventing them by allowing 
such impulses to be satisfied vicariously. The distinction between retribution and 
revenge, and the role of revenge in the criminal justice system, is not the substance 
of this article, but legal theorists who promote the idea of a distinction21 tend to 
argue that the achievement of vengeance – once moved into the hands of the state 
– is justifiable and ‘healthy’, while when the ‘law’ is taken into one’s own hands it 
is not. 
In a recent overview of the psychological literature on revenge, Grobbink et 
al argue for a more balanced account of revenge, suggesting that a distinction cannot 
be made between ‘healthy’ and ‘pathological’ revenge in clinical practice, and that 
18
 This perspective originates with T Hobbes The Elements of Law Natural and Politic. Part I: 
Human Nature; Part II: De Corpore Politico with Three Lives: Human Nature Pt. 1 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008).
19
 I C Rosen ‘Revenge—the Hate That Dare Not Speak Its Name: A Psychoanalytic Perspective’ 
(2007) 55 J of the American Psych Ass 595 at 607.
20
 C G Schoenfeld ‘In defense of retribution in the law’ (1966) 35 Psych Quart 108.
21
 See, for example, L Zaibert ‘Punishment and Revenge’ (2006) 25 L and Phil 81; Nozick, above n 
15.
9its constitution and function are entirely reliant on the coping style and personality 
of the avenger.22 In this literature, revenge is considered a ‘pursuit’, which develops 
as a result of strain23 and the distortion of self-image of the grandiose self. While 
we adopt a certain cynicism about the extent to which revenge thrives simply as a 
matter of cognitive distortions entirely divorced from cultural context, the 
implication here is that a vicarious enjoyment of revenge, when criminal justice 
produces a satisfactory result, is regarded as ‘healthy’, and thus has a utility. Indeed, 
Frijda suggests that society should not deny or condemn the desire for revenge, 
since the pursuit itself may – when taken ‘healthily’ – restore psychological 
balance.24 In this vein, Posner posits that, in the past, people endowed with an 
instinct to retaliate would have tended to be more successful in struggles for 
survival and the urge for revenge survives as an evolutionary ‘supplement’ to law 
enforcement.25  In other words, in this model revenge is still very much alive, and 
considered a ‘natural’ and universal urge that the criminal law has a role to play in 
mitigating through ‘measured’ means. Due process, as Sarat remarks, has the power 
to ‘discipline passion’.26 
We might also locate psychoanalytic explanations for vengeance in this 
second history of revenge’s relationship with the law, where it is argued that 
revenge is envisioned as an ahistorical, asocial and narcissistic27 will-to-power that 
22
 L H Grobbink J J L Derksen and H J C van Marle, ‘Revenge: An Analysis of Its Psychological 
Underpinnings’ (2015) 59 Int J of Offender Therapy and Comparative Crim 892.
23
 R Agnew ‘Foundation for a General Strain Theory of Crime and Delinquency’ (1992) 30 
Criminology 47.
24
 N H Frijda The Laws of Emotion (Hove: Routledge, 2007).
25
 R A Posner Law and Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 3rd edition, 2009) p 
79.
26
 A Sarat When the State Kills: Capital Punishment and the American Condition (Princeton, NK: 
Princeton University Press, 2001) p 39.
27
 See, for example, H J Beattie ‘Revenge’ (2005) 53 J of the American Psych Ass 513; H Kohut, 
‘Thoughts on Narcissism and Narcissistic Rage’ (1972) 27 The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 
360.
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must be repeatedly defeated by recourse to the rational authority of the state and its 
ability to suppress it. As Beattie puts it, ‘[t]he high-octane jet fuel of revenge is 
narcissistic rage, occasioned by humiliating attacks on the grandiose self with its 
idealized self-object, which result in a primitive drive for control and omnipotence 
through revenge’.28 All id and no superego, here revenge is considered a symptom 
of pathological narcissism,29 where the avenger is seeking to eliminate an 
uncomfortable or painful emotion by restoring equilibrium. 
To date, what is missing from either psychological accounts of revenge or 
legal scholarship on the vengeful properties of criminal law, however, is any sense 
of the gendered or erotic dimensions of revenge, or how the context of intimate 
relationships shapes its constitution and method. Durkheim suggests that the urge 
to punish is itself a ‘passionate reaction’30 to the violation of socially constructed 
rules, and we are interested here in unearthing how the criminal law attempts to 
grapple with the violation of the ‘rules of civility’ that accompany the breakdown 
of a romantic relationship, and in particular the ways in which it draws on 
gendered narratives of revenge. 
A supposedly psychical drive for revenge is also not sufficient to explain 
the legal valorization of gendered revenge in the context of heteronormative 
romantic scripts, nor its consistent cultural-historical popularity. No matter which 
history or understanding of revenge one follows, Miller contends that it continues 
to operate for most of us on the periphery of our consciousness,31 occasionally 
aroused and quickly suppressed. Indeed, our culture often seems deeply conflicted 
28
 Beattie, above n 27, at 515.
29
 On narcissism and revenge, see also R P Brown ‘Vengeance Is Mine: Narcissism, Vengeance, and 
the Tendency to Forgive’ (2004) 38 Journal of Research in Personality 576. 
30
 E Durkheim The Division of Labour in Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edition, 
2013), p 85.
31
 Miller, above n 17.
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about the moral status of revenge. While revenge is generally thought to be 
antithetical to law and the values of Western societies, it nevertheless retains its 
appeal as a ‘pervasive theme in the movies [we] pay to see, TV [we] watch and 
novels [we] read.32 Thus, perhaps it is short-sighted to suggest that a narcissistic 
sense of injury is driven purely by narcissistic rage. In some cultures revenge is 
in fact a common and sometimes obligatory social norm, often in the context of 
adultery. Rather, if there is a collective cultural sense that certain personal slights 
require avenging, ‘injecting disorder into order and ordering the internal 
disorder’,33 then the social and legal scripts that determine ‘duty’, ‘law’ and 
‘justice’ at the termination of romantic relationships, often resulting in ‘crimes of 
passion’, must be further examined to understand revenge pornography, and how 
these scripts have influenced popular and official discourse on how disclosure of 
private sexual photographs should be dealt with through criminal law. 
The Legal Backdrop
 Section 33 emerged as an addition to a plethora of existing laws targeting 
technologically assisted or enabled sexual offending.34 The new offence does not 
criminalise all private sexual images disclosed without consent as it bites only if 
their distribution is intended to cause distress to the victim, providing a barrier to 
prosecutions against those who indirectly redistribute the images through social 
media or email.35 Whilst this approach to mens rea has not been followed 
32
 A Sarat and T Kearns ‘The Cultural Lives of Law’ in A Sarat and T Kearns (eds), Law in the 
Domains of Culture (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press 1998) p 17.
33
 Y Neuman ‘On Revenge’ (2012) 17 Psychoanalysis, Culture & Soc'y 1.
34
 There are numerous sexually motivated offences that have benefited from the advancement of 
technology or indeed a product of them, including and not limited to voyeurism, child pornography, 
extreme pornography, stalking and harassment.
35
 J F Quinn and C J Forsyth ‘Describing Sexual Behavior in the Era of the Internet: A Typology for 
Empirical Research’ (2005) 26 Deviant Behavior 191.
12
internationally,36 to date the legal response in England and Wales has continued to 
uphold this specific requirement, regarding it as central to obtaining conviction. It 
is this aspect of the offence that we address over the course of this article. 
The very enactment of a specific offence to tackle revenge pornography 
implies that current legal remedies are not fit for purpose as an adequate deterrent, 
yet it will be seen that both the new offence and most pre-existing laws are also 
reactive as opposed to preventative. Prior to the enactment of Section 33(1), legal 
action could be taken under a number of existing laws both criminal and civil. For 
example, criminal action under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 or civil 
action for a ‘breach of confidence’. Those pre-existing laws that serve a dual 
function, as both reactive and preventative, such as injunctions and the threat of a 
civil action for breach of confidence, are often limited to those victims who have 
the financial backing to bring such action. Further, neither of these laws cover all 
cases of revenge pornography and are limited in scope; harassment laws require a 
course of conduct37 and breach of confidence requires an obligation of confidence 
to exist between parties.38  Despite their shortcomings, these laws provided and still 
do provide an alternative basis for action in instances involving the disclosure of 
personal, private and sexual imagery without an individual’s consent. Whilst it is 
not the intention of this article to highlight every shortcoming of the existing laws, 
an overview is essential in order to understand the location of revenge pornography 
36
 For example, the US state of Minnesota criminalises the act regardless of the intention under Laws 
of Minnesota, Chapter 126 S.F.No. 2713 (USA)
37
 Under existing harassment law in the England & Wales a course of conduct must be undertaken 
on two or more occasions, which is unhelpful for victims of revenge pornography given that 
resulting  harms can flow from a single disclosure of such an image.
38
 To establish a breach of confidence the information disclosed must have been imparted in such a 
way that imposed an obligation of confidence. This is not always the case in revenge pornography 
matters -  most notably where an image has been obtained from someone’s phone/icloud and 
disclosed without consent and then shared. 
13
law within the context of both a broader roster of laws, which demonstrates that the 
new offence offers little additional benefit to victims.
The primary means of prosecuting the disclosure of private sexual images 
prior to the new revenge pornography offence was through stalking and harassment 
offences. Stalking and harassment were made criminal offences with the enactment 
of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.39 Section 2 makes it an offence to 
cause ‘alarm or distress’ and put ‘people in fear of violence’. It is a requirement of 
the offence that a course of conduct is undertaken on two or more occasions 
resulting in a fear of violence or causing alarm or distress. Clearly the requirement 
for any course of conduct to be undertaken at least twice poses a problem in cases 
of revenge pornography. It would necessitate the disclosure of an image on two or 
more occasions before even engaging the law. However, the threat of disclosure 
could also be included under harassment laws, which, notably, would not be 
covered under the new offence.  As with other pre-existing laws, stalking and 
harassment offences are reactive. The same issue is present when considering the 
new Section 33 offence, which is perhaps inevitable given that in criminal law 
individuals must engage in a course of conduct.  However, a threat to disclose such 
imagery would at least be covered under the Protection from Harassment Act 1977, 
rendering the new offence even less effective given its focus is on the act and not 
the threat.  Most notably, the offence offers no additional practical redress to the 
victims of revenge pornography, such as the cover of ‘threats’, and serves nothing 
other than a retributive function for a specific offence. 
Section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 makes it a criminal 
offence to send another an article which is ‘indecent or grossly offensive’, or which 
39
 Amended by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 to include stalking.
14
‘conveys a threat, or which is false’. There is a requirement that the perpetrator 
intends to ‘cause distress or anxiety’ to the recipient. The offence covers the 
electronic communication of articles such as letters, writing of all descriptions, 
electronic communications, photographs and other images in a material form, tape 
recordings, films and video recordings; covering photographs in revenge 
pornography cases provided the terms of the offence are met. Connolly v DPP40 
considered the terms ‘indecent or grossly offensive’, confirming that these were to 
be interpreted as ordinary English words.41 The problem with this provision is that 
the article – in the case of revenge pornography, the photo – needs to be offensive. 
It would require a finding that a private, sexual image, devoid of any illegal act, is 
indecent or grossly offensive. This presents a somewhat heteronormative outlook 
on sexual relationships and private sexual encounters as it would require that sexual 
acts or displays, considered outside existing standards of propriety, be found 
offensive. It is also arguable that the act of disclosure without consent is the 
offensive act, not the image itself. Additionally, in most cases it would not be the 
actual revenge pornography victim who receives the image but other parties. It 
would be the intended or actual recipient only who would have access to redress 
through this law. 
In addition to criminal actions, civil actions have also been undertaken, the 
success of which is largely dependent on the financial status of the perpetrator and 
the victim, in order to bring or defend a claim. It is worth noting at this point that 
the new offence fails to provide a course of action against hosts of websites or 
commercial entities that would have the financial net worth to make a civil action 
40
 [2007] 2 All ER 1012
41
 [2007] 2 All ER 1012 
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worthwhile. Laws concerning copyright42 and tortious wrongs such as ‘breach of 
confidence’43 are examples of civil actions applicable to revenge pornography 
cases. Copyright law in its most basic form serves as a right to prevent others from 
copying or reproducing the author’s work. It is the expression of an idea that is 
protected and not the idea itself. This is especially relevant for artistic works, such 
as graphic works and photos, with which we are concerned here. To what extent 
revenge pornography images themselves can actually be regarded as artistic is fairly 
unambiguous given that most works of art are afforded protection irrespective of 
artistic quality. It is noted that some revenge pornography cases involve the victim’s 
own photos being disseminated without their consent. Therefore, the victim is the 
author in this case, and the distribution (the forwarding of the image without 
consent) infringes copyright. The one thing that sets copyright law apart from the 
new Section 33 offence is the ‘take down’ remedy offered to those whose copyright 
is infringed. In theory, this would provide victims with a way of serving notices on 
website hosts to take images down. 
Whilst copyright law may serve as a viable course of legal action in response 
to the disclosure of private sexual imagery,44 the restrictions placed on utilising this 
area of law are significant. Financially, a pursuit to challenge copyright 
infringement under the respective laws requires substantial financial backing, for 
which there is no state-sanctioned support (such as legal aid in criminal 
proceedings). Further, the action, as with all the laws discussed, fails to prevent 
unauthorised dissemination occurring. Given the nuanced nature of copyright law 
42
 See Part 1 of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA) as amended, although also a 
criminal offence, see section 107 CDPA.
43
 See Duchess of Argyll v Duke of Argyll [1967] Ch 302
44
 A Levendowski ‘Using Copyright to Combat Revenge Porn’ (2013) 3 NY University J of Intel 
Prop & Ent L 422.
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it is also unlikely that any potential perpetrator would be aware of it and in turn 
deterred by it, thus curbing the likelihood of any revenge pornography offence 
being committed. A further issue relates to the use of the internet in revenge 
pornography cases, as the complexity of any case would be largely determined by 
where the imagery was being hosted and by whom. This would determine which 
jurisdictions’ copyright laws are applicable to the infringement and subsequent 
infringements. 
Action could be taken in tort prior to the enactment of Section 33, as set out 
in A v B Plc45 concerning a breach of confidence. This ruling applied in cases where 
confidential images are disseminated within or outside marriage. Importantly, under 
this action such an obligation of confidence extends to others who forward an image 
on. Under this law there is a duty of confidence ‘whenever a person receives 
information he knows or ought to know is fairly and reasonable to be regarded as 
confidential’ or in matters where it is clearly of a private nature.46 As with actions 
under copyright law, for victims to pursue an action in tort substantial financial 
backing as well as time is required. In revenge pornography cases time for lengthy 
litigation is not a luxury victims have, given that once an image is uploaded onto 
the internet or disseminated in any way it can continue to spread at speed.  
As will be demonstrated, the emergence of a specific offence to curb the 
‘disclosure of private sexual images’ does little to solve the current shortcomings 
of the pre-existing laws. It serves as an addition to the array of tools that attempt to 
tackle hostility and violence against women online but fails to attack the 
underpinning attitudes towards women’s privacy that exist beneath it. Whilst it is 
45
 [2002] Q.B. 195
46See above n 38 for an explanation of limitations in respect of an action for ‘breach of confidence’ 
in revenge pornography cases. 
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accepted that the law may have a symbolic value in outlining the distribution of 
private sexual images as explicitly criminal behaviour,47 the focus on ‘revenge’ 
narratives that underpinned the legislative process, and the likely operation of the 
law, does not offer the practical redress needed by victims of revenge pornography 
and other related offences, and instead reinforces the gendered power relations of 
heterosexual socio-cultural scripts. It is not argued here that all wrongs and the 
harms that flow from them should be criminalised, certainly the proper contours of 
criminalisation require limitations to prevent, for example, the criminalisation of 
trivial wrongs. In the case of revenge pornography the disclosure of private sexual 
images, contrary to Section 33, clearly result in harms that cause psychological or 
other damage to a person’s quality of life beyond that of mere trivialities, such as 
loss of employment and breach of privacy.48 Gillespie argues that a rationale for 
criminalising revenge pornography is to protect a person’s sexual autonomy and 
identity likening the disclosure of private sexual images to the absence of consent 
in sexual offences.49 It will be explained below how the new law purports to protect 
women from the very attitudes it threatens to reinforce; heteronormative 
assumptions about femininity and women’s sexuality long embedded in the 
criminal-legal construction of revenge. As we have seen, the primary distinguishing 
feature of the new offence is its focus on punishing the specific intent to cause 
distress through the circulation of private sexual photographs. However, the offence 
fails to take into consideration either how this intention is frequently gendered in 
the context of intimate relationships, or the harms it may cause beyond distress. 
47
 R Cotterrell The Sociology of Law’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1984).
48
 See A P Simester and A von Hirsch Crimes, Harms and Wrongs: On the Principles of 
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A Dish Best Served Cold: Sexual Revenge and the Law
Discourses of revenge found in cases involving crimes of passion, where men 
have been excused for killing their adulterous wives,50 and how the criminal law 
has historically treated gendered revenge motives, assist us firstly in analysing to 
what extent socio-cultural revenge scripts underpin the new offence, and secondly 
in identifying how the problem of victim-blaming is likely to arise in order to 
establish mens rea. In the context of spousal homicide, a defendant’s violent 
actions have been constructed as excusatory and justificatory51 under partial 
defences that reduced a charge of murder to manslaughter. Horder notes that the 
historical function of the partial defence of provocation was justificatory ‘because 
it requires the defendants to explain their conduct, in part, by reference to the 
“moral warrant” that they believed the gravity of the provocation gave them for 
retaliating so violently in anger’.52 In terms of the excusatory element, the defence 
does not operate to ‘correct’ the defendant’s wrongful conduct; instead it sheds 
‘favourable moral light on what D did through a focus on the reasons that D 
committed that wrongdoing.’53 The defence’s focus on the victim’s actions in 
such cases, and what she might have done to provoke the defendant, is often 
pivotal to the verdict. Whilst revenge is not an explicit component of the Section 
33 offence, it is the way in which it is likely to operate in the courts that demands 
comparison with provocation. 
The old law of provocation was set out in Section 3 of the Homicide Act 
1957, reducing a charge of murder to manslaughter and in doing so removing the 
50
 J Horder and K Fitz-Gibbon ‘When sexual infidelity triggers murder: examining the homicide law 
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51
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mandatory life sentence associated with murder.54 In cases where the provocation 
defence was used to excuse the defendant’s actions in ‘crimes of passion’55 it 
hinged on whether the victim’s actions provoked the defendant to lose his or her 
self-control. Cases concerning the operation of the provocation plea evidence the 
way in which male sexual jealousy is regarded in criminal-legal discourse as 
another ‘natural’ evolutionary supplement: a question of ‘male sexual 
proprietariness’.56 In the case of R v Suratan, R v Humes and R v Wilkinson 
(Attorney General’s Reference No. 74, No. 95 and No. 118 of 2002),57 the appeal 
concerned the sentences imposed for manslaughter in a matrimonial or domestic 
setting, where a plea of provocation had been accepted, which were regarded as 
overly ‘lenient’ and therefore failed to ‘reflect the seriousness of the offences’.58 
Sentences of between 2 and 7 years had been imposed upon the three men for 
what Howe describes as an ‘annihilation of their female partners’.59 Such lenient 
sentences, handed down in instances where men kill women suspected of adultery, 
have served as evidence that the courts regard the men as justifiably provoked.60 
The law of provocation primarily focused on the behaviour of the victim and what 
they did to cause the behaviour of the defendant. 
54 The requirements of the defence in Section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 were as follows: 
‘Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the judge can find that the person charged 
was provoked (whether by things done or by things said or by both together) to lose his self-control, 
the question whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did shall be 
left to be determined by the jury; and in determining that question the jury shall take into account 
everything both done and said according to the effect which, in their opinion, it would have on a 
reasonable man.’
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It is accepted that revenge in relation to Section 33 and the partial defences 
of provocation and loss of control function in different ways. In the case of Section 
33, the defendant’s ‘intention to cause distress’ is central to establishing the offence 
itself in the courts, whereas revenge in the defence of provocation  operates to 
reduce liability in cases of murder. However, the way revenge is operationalized in 
practice, in both offences, risks individualising violence against women, 
reimagining that violence as an act of revenge with justificatory or excusatory 
qualities that limit wrongfulness. In Section 33 the focus is  on the motivations of 
the perpetrator instead of the impact on the victim and, like partial defences to 
homicide, its operation is also likely to be scaffolded around male proprietariness. 
It has the potential to bring to the table a discussion or at least, a consideration, of 
what the victim did to deserve this. Ultimately, both homicide and revenge 
pornography offences permit attempts to excuse or justify harmful behaviour by 
constructing it as anything but violence against women. The search for a rationale 
as to why the avenger might have sought to disclose private sexual images to cause 
distress allows for the possibility that victims risk being seen ultimately as still at 
fault: she got what she deserved. 
As noted in the opening section of this article, revenge pornography has 
been constructed in popular discourse and in practice as a kind of contemporary 
‘crime of passion’ through the narrative of the jilted sexual partner. It is 
specifically a question of ‘passion’ that appears to govern the mens rea and thus 
the threshold for culpability in Section 33(1)(b). As Ledward and Agate have 
noted, in many Section 33 cases that have come before the courts to date evidence 
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of intent is fairly obvious,61 but the necessity of the provision of evidence risks 
necessitating exploration of a rationale for sharing the image and thus examination 
of the victim’s behaviour. Indeed, this may be entirely necessary for a successful 
prosecution. As the question of intent turns on malice rather than sexual 
gratification, and the Section 33 offence is not a sexual offence, the usual 
protections proffered to victims of sexual violence do not currently apply and 
serve only to exacerbate the potential problem of double victimisation.62 As we 
will demonstrate, media reports of these cases rarely shirk on the circumstantial 
details that led the perpetrator to share the image. The very fact that these details 
are available for press coverage suggests that precipitating factors are already 
being cross-examined in court. In addition, figures from the Crown Prosecution 
Service 2015-16 – with around 61% of reported cases resulting in no further action 
– suggest that either there is insufficient evidence of specific intent, or that the 
victim has withdrawn support for action63. We surmise that one factor that might 
give rise to the latter is the problem of potential victim blaming, and the need for 
cross examination of precipitating factors that Section 33(1)(b) requires to prove 
intent. 
As Jacoby suggests, there are ‘written and unwritten laws governing 
sexual relationships, which, because of their emotional nature, are generally 
treated as questions of passion rather than power’.64 Thus, it is perhaps no surprise 
that the operation of the law risks focusing on the ‘passions’ that stimulate a desire 
61
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to cause distress. This significantly limits the circumstances in which a case is 
likely to come to trial to those involving clear evidence of intent,65 but more 
crucially also represents an attempt to transpose the rules of civility that have 
historically governed romantic relationships, both written and unwritten, to the 
digital age. This leads Jacoby to the rather controversial question: ‘ought people 
who are bound together … by emotionally binding ties of intimacy, be allowed to 
take revenge on each other in ways that would ordinarily be forbidden by law?’66 
Closer inspection of how revenge in the context of intimate relationships has been 
constructed in criminal-legal discourse in recent years not only aids our 
understanding of the legal context for the new offence, but provides clues as to 
why discussion within the legislative process and media reporting became 
dependent on retrogressive constructions of (predominantly) heterosexual 
relationships. As we will see, references to love, honour and injury pervade these 
cases, and – although there have been cases reported of female revenge porn 
perpetrators – demonstrate the particularly gendered qualities that haunt legal 
constructions of revenge. 
An important development in the recent history of punishing crimes of 
passion is the supposed distinction between a ‘loss of control’ and revenge in 
partial defences to murder, outlined briefly in the previous section. Section 54(4) 
of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 makes clear that: ‘Subsection (1) does not 
apply if, in doing or being a party to the killing, D acted in a considered desire for 
revenge.’67 What distinguishes a momentary loss of control and revenge in law is 
a sense that the injury is inflicted in a considered manner, aiming to ‘right’ a 
65
 McGlynn and Rackley, above n 2. 
66
 Jacoby, above n 65, at 223.
67
 Section 54(4) Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
23
perceived ‘wrong’. Nevertheless, in the case of R v Clinton, Parker and Evans,68 
this distinction appeared particularly flimsy, and the judgment hinged on the 
meaning of revenge. In each case brought to the attention of the appellate courts, 
a jilted husband killed his ex-wife after she had admitted to him that she had been 
having a relationship with another man. Despite the move to exclude sexual 
infidelity as a qualifying trigger in the partial defence of loss of control, the 
perpetrator may be treated sympathetically in the case of romantic relationships 
where it is assumed that the ‘passion’ governing violence in response to infidelity, 
sexual jealousy and ‘crushed dreams’, provided it is used to contextualise ‘a sense 
of being seriously wronged by a thing said or done’69, provides the defendant with 
a justifiable sense of being wronged and excuse to use violence. . As Lord Judge 
averred in his ruling in Clinton: ‘Relationship breakdown is always fraught with 
tension and difficulty, with the possibility of misunderstanding and the potential 
for apparently irrational fury’.70 
That a ‘special case’ is made for revenge motivations in the breakdown of 
a romantic relationship in this judgment is revealing, and the implications of 
Clinton for cases involving spousal homicide have been the subject of multiple 
criticisms.71 For our purposes, however, that vengeful motivations in the context 
of romantic relationships are treated as  excusatory also has symbolic significance, 
and is potentially catastrophic for victims of revenge pornography. As Lord Judge 
goes on to argue in Clinton: 
68
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Experience over many generations has shown that, however it may 
become apparent, when it does, sexual infidelity has the potential to 
… produce a completely unpredictable, and sometimes violent 
response … [which] often stems from a sense of betrayal and 
heartbreak, and crushed dreams.72
This kind of language, used to describe the circumstances in which Section 54(4) 
does not apply, betrays judicial sentiments towards the anticipated gender roles 
taken in romantic relationships, and the sense that when ‘passion’ clouds 
judgement, it may be taken as an excusatory factor. This view of revenge – and 
perhaps the ‘experience over generations’ the judges refer to – also recalls the 
long history of possessive erotic love, in which the old ‘male dream of 
symmetry’,73 with man as the possessor and woman as exclusively possessed 
becomes central to the gendered constitution of revenge; where one’s 
‘hotbloodedness’ is considered a necessary precursor to the defence of erotic love, 
and a guard over one’s manliness and virility.  As Howe puts it, Clinton reveals 
that the ‘profoundly sexed early modern fiction of his possessory right over her 
[which] can be traced through centuries of case law still finds a place in late modern 
and putatively egalitarian democracies’.74 While not all Section 33 cases involve 
suspected infidelity, as we will see, the cases reported in the press to date invariably 
do rest on sexual jealousy. Further, however, the analogy with Clinton and other 
cases of intimate partner homicide ultimately demonstrate the problem at the heart 
of the offence. While the specific intent requirement allows for the possibility that 
intent to cause distress might be manifested in a number of ways, it nevertheless 
72
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implies that the victim must have done something that provoked the defendant to 
develop such an intent. We therefore retain a certain cynicism about the operation 
of the offence. Where the circumstances in which the perpetrator circulates an 
image are revealed, and while the victim can be cross-examined to provide a 
backstory that offers a rationale for distributing the image to cause distress, juror 
sentiments towards the ‘rules’ of romantic relationships may well govern trial 
outcomes. 
Wild Justice: Tracing Revenge in Media, Parliamentary and Policy 
Narratives on Revenge Pornography
Motivations for revenge pornography have been central to media coverage of the 
offence. The importance of the media coverage of revenge pornography cannot be 
understated given that the term revenge pornography itself is media generated.75 
Despite our concerns raised previously – that the offence focuses primarily on the 
motivation behind the act – the term ‘revenge pornography’ dominates headlines of 
stories about those victimised. For example, in April 2016 the Plymouth Herald 
published a story in which Shaun Kinsman posted 35 sexual images of his ex-
partner online following their breakup in ‘an act of revenge pornography.’76 
Kinsman declared that he posted the images in ‘revenge’ when he was rejected by 
the victim and ‘felt hurt’. This story reflects the typical revenge narrative of non-
consensual image distribution following a breakup outlined in the introduction. 
75
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However, the article also provides details of the victim’s supposed infidelity to the 
perpetrator, noting that the image was posted on Facebook ‘giving the location of 
the town where she lived, her age and claims that she had cheated on him with her 
ex’.77 By providing information about the victim’s supposed infidelity, the readers 
of the news become the judges of whether the assailant should be excused for 
distributing the private intimate image without her consent. The questions posed to 
these moral arbiters concern whether the women’s act of infidelity justifies or 
excuses the act of uploading the images, or whether the woman’s rejection of 
Kinsman equates to an act worthy of revenge. 
In the media reporting of Kinsman’s case, the ways in which infidelity is 
presented as central to the story are two-fold. On the one hand, it reifies violence 
against women as a justifiable act of revenge; on the other, by focusing on what the 
victim did to provoke such treatment, it preserves the status of masculinity as a 
means of controlling or punishing women who dare to betray or leave their partners. 
In turn, this reproduces the myth of male proprietariness over the endings of 
romantic relationships, where men and only men can instigate separation. It is noted 
that Kinsman ‘felt hurt’ and revenge pornography was his means of getting ‘one up 
on her’ because of her supposed infidelity.78 Violence against women is repackaged 
as a story of infidelity, hurt and revenge. Similarly, in the case of Paul Deacon,79 
the perpetrator undertook a course of violence against his ex-partner, yet the media 
narrative again references her alleged infidelity, noting how Deacon, during a 
confrontation at the victim’s house, ‘[accused] her of seeing someone else’,80 which 
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essentially provides the same infidelity revenge context as seen in the case of 
Kinsman. 
While media reporting of revenge pornography cases tends ultimately to 
condemn the practice, it is perhaps unsurprising that journalists cannot help but 
linger on precipitating factors for the offence, namely the behaviour of the victim, 
which suggests that the sexual history of victims is indeed being scrutinised in the 
courts. However, as we will demonstrate, this is not simply a problem of 
sensationalist reporting, since this factor is endemic to the debates surrounding 
criminalisation, and even CPS and sentencing guidance. In the Parliamentary 
debates about revenge pornography that led to the creation of the offence, the 
purpose it should serve and what it specifically aims to criminalise proved difficult 
to define, but it was at this stage that revenge motivations took centre-stage as the 
primary target of the new offence. In the first Commons debate in June 2014, Maria 
Miller MP, who raised the issue on behalf of a constituent who had been victimised, 
drew on the narrative of victims as 
ordinary women who have been in loving relationships .. [W]hen that 
relationship goes wrong, their partner’s revenge is to post on the 
internet intimate pictures taken over the course of that relationship as 
well as distributing them to employers, families and friends.81
Miller was drawing on the specific experiences of her own constituent as a case 
study in this instance, and it should be noted that she was careful to avoid the use 
of any language which might responsibilise the victim, but initiating the debate by 
on Facebook’ Mail Online 20 October 2016, available at <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/~/article-
3856002/index.html> (accessed 1 November 2016).
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providing this specific story of revenge nevertheless shapes the terms of it, focusing 
the target for legislation around this quite specific narrative of romantic vengeance. 
Miller went on to describe the internet as a kind of ‘wild west’, implying 
that despite the fact that the days of treating it as such are ‘long gone and that 
freedom online is no longer unconditional’, there is a sense that justice in this space 
is subject to the same pre-modern blood feuds that were curbed by civilised state-
sanctioned retributive justice. Miller here could almost be drawing directly on 
Francis Bacon’s famous essay, Of Revenge, from 1625, which describes revenge as 
a ‘kind of wild justice, which the more man’s nature runs to the more ought law to 
weed it out.’82  The implication is that the internet, as Balkin alludes, is now a 
virtual environment ‘which will reshape legal concepts like jurisdiction and 
ownership’.83 In cyberspace, extra-legal ‘wild justice’ in the context of intimate 
relationships might be described as a new ‘frontier’ for legislators to colonise and 
overpower. The internet is constructed in these debates as a new and threatening 
terrain, in which blood revenge runs rampant and must be ‘weeded out’ with new 
legislative constraints.
When the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill 2015 eventually reached the House 
of Lords, the question of the purpose of the offence was again raised, and in 
particular whether it would constitute a sexual offence. The original Amendment 
tabled suggested that an offence would only be committed if the publisher intended 
that someone ‘looking at the image did so for the purpose of obtaining sexual 
gratification’.84 Baroness Grender also chose to focus in her comments on the 
motive to ‘sexually humiliate’ in order to demonstrate that the libidinous properties 
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of revenge must be at the forefront of the offence. Baroness Kennedy, however, 
urged the Lords to take greater care over the drafting:
It is important to draft widely without specifying the nature of the 
motivation. That is because it is always difficult to pin down motivation 
… It is really an issue about consent: has a person consented to the 
disclosure of intimate photographs? It is not an issue of speculating 
what the motivations might be.85 
Nevertheless, Baroness Kennedy’s plea for a refocus on consent met with little 
response. Baroness Morris returned almost immediately to the question of motive 
in her reply to Baroness Kennedy, and seemed to ignore the consequences of harm, 
saying: ‘[r]evenge is a horrible and destructive motive generally’. But perhaps the 
most revealing statement in this debate came from Baroness Barker, who again put 
the onus on motivation to criminalise:
Our amendment tries to focus not on the definition of what is 
pornographic but on the act of revenge. That is why, in our amendment, 
we have concentrated on the initial posting of an image rather than the 
reproduction or the recommunication of it, because the act of revenge 
happens in the initial posting.86
While this amendment was, in the end, withdrawn, that the terms of the debate 
remained focused on the law’s capacity to deter and suppress the motivation to seek 
revenge in the perpetrator is significant. This stymied from the very first the 
potential of the offence to capture a broader range of technology-facilitated sexual 
violence and the harms they may cause. 
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Since the law came into force, considerable media attention has been paid 
to the new offence, but it has not escaped critique. In 2016, scarcely a year after the 
law came into force, the Liberal Democrats tabled a series of amendments, 
suggesting that a low number of convictions might be remedied by reforming the 
law to mirror Scotland’s, in which the specific intent requirement in Section 
33(1)(b) is not present, and instead proof of mere recklessness as to causing ‘fear, 
alarm or distress’ will suffice. While we are cautious of the possibility that this 
amendment could lead to a slippage between ‘sexting’ and revenge pornography, 
and would not recommend that the Scottish model is followed,87 the amendment 
does at least consider a wider range of possible harms to victims. In addition, the 
possibility of granting anonymity to victims was considered in Parliament. 
However, the amendments were not moved, and in the House of Lords, Baroness 
Williams reiterated the importance of the offence being ‘undiluted’ from its original 
aim of punishing revenge:
This malicious intent—the revenge element of revenge porn, so to 
speak—is a key feature of the offence and we believe it would be wrong 
to dilute this by applying the offence to conduct that is the result of 
recklessness rather than a deliberately malicious act.88
As we see, in these more recent debates there is little discussion of countering the 
surface-scratching nature of the legal response to disclosure of private sexual 
images, and although it is reassuring to see a wider range of possible harms victims 
may experience signposted, the response fails to delve much beyond specific intent. 
87
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Guidance on prosecution and sentencing has also remained focused on this 
aspect of the offence. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) issued guidelines to 
prosecutors reiterating at least one of the purposes of the disclosure of private sexual 
imagery must be to cause ‘humiliation or embarrassment’89 to the victim to meet 
the threshold for prosecution. Indeed, the guidance document itself is specifically 
titled ‘Revenge Pornography’. This language fails to deal adequately with the social 
and economic harms associated with revenge pornography that go beyond 
humiliation or embarrassment, and instead reduces the harm to merely an emotional 
or psychological response. Certainly, McGlynn, Rackley and Houghton have 
asserted that revenge pornography should form part of a continuum of ‘image-based 
sexual abuse’90 in which a connection is laid bare between revenge pornography 
and other forms of sexual violence, which they argue share both characteristics and 
consequences. 
The reductive language used in this guidance to describe the associated 
harms of Section 33 offences distinguishes the way the offence is understood and 
consequently, responded to.  For example, the limited remedies available to victims 
of disclosure of private sexual images fail to acknowledge the range of harms 
suffered by victims, such as breach of privacy, loss of employment and harassment. 
Nowhere in the CPS guidance are any of these harms mentioned. As Mathen 
suggests, refocusing on the link between revenge and distress has a certain social 
currency, in that it ‘evokes some of what society finds especially horrifying about 
such activity’,91 and therefore possesses an expressive function, but of course, this 
89
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link may not be consistent in all cases. Yet Vora notes that underlying legal 
frameworks concerning disclosure of private sexual images also exists a ‘shadow 
taxonomy’92 that minimises or trivializes the amount and types of harms 
experienced by victims, such as the ‘violation of fundamental rights to sexual 
autonomy, integrity and sexual expression’ together with ‘physical and mental 
illness’.93  The result of this ‘shadow taxonomy’ is to ‘deny victims an effective 
remedy’.94 By failing to acknowledge the range of harms associated with disclosure 
of private sexual images, ‘effective’ remedies such as takedown orders or 
compensation for loss of employment are absent from discussion. Whilst Vora’s 
work centres on the judicial language used in the courts, the same can be said for 
the language used in legal and policy debates elsewhere, and indeed, this is what 
we argue here – that the trivialisation or even disregard for the broader harms 
associated with revenge pornography go little way to improving current legal 
remedies.  
More recently, the Sentencing Council initiated a consultation process in 
England and Wales over a set of draft guidelines for use in Section 33 cases. The 
proposed guidelines argue for a two-step process, whereby sentencing range is 
determined first on culpability factors, and secondly on the level of harm caused. 
Step one appears to address the question that there may be a spectrum of 
motivations. It draws on the distinction between ‘hot’ and ‘cold-blooded’ revenge 
to determine the level of culpability, differentiating between offences which are 
essentially ‘pre-meditated’, where there is a degree of ‘significant planning and/or 
[resembles a] sophisticated offence’ (cold-blooded), and offences where there is 
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‘little or no planning’ (hot-blooded). Whilst the importance of reflecting 
comparative blameworthiness in sentencing is acknowledged there is a risk here 
that disclosure of private sexual images might more easily be excused and/or 
justified, at least partially, if significant evidence is found that revenge was borne 
out of sudden and fleeting bouts of passion/fury. In addition, it is our contention 
that it is much more likely that cases in which culpability falls into Category C – 
where there is neither significant planning nor ‘an intention to cause maximum 
distress’ (as signposted in Category A) – would likely not be prosecuted at all due 
to insufficient evidence of specific intent
Step two of the draft guidelines highlight that sentencing should also 
consider the level of harm experienced by the victim. Whilst the move away from 
an exclusive focus on motivations is welcome, and whilst the Council does make 
an effort to address some of the harms suffered by victims, they are nevertheless 
extremely limited as a result of the centrality of the distress element to the offence. 
McGlynn et al have urged that revenge pornography be understood alongside 
other forms of sexual abuse in order that the harms it induces be better 
acknowledged and understood.95 When comparing the proposed sentencing 
guidelines to the sentencing guidelines for sexual offences, many of the harms 
associated with the latter are relevant here, such as ‘severe psychological or 
physical harm,’ ‘additional degradation/humiliation’ and ‘violence or threats of 
violence’. 96 However, the Section 33 guidelines barely touch on these. Category 
1 – the highest level of harm – is limited to when there is ‘very serious distress 
95
 McGlynn, Rackley and Houghton, above n 90.
96
 Sentencing Council, Sexual Offences Definitive Guidelines (2013) available at 
<http://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Final_Sexual_Offences_Definitive_Guideline_content_web1.pdf> (accessed 2 
June 2017).
34
caused to the victim’, harm where the ‘victim is particularly vulnerable’ and 
where the ‘offence has considerable practical impact on the victim.’97 
There is also a considerable slippage between the terms ‘distress’ and 
‘harm’ that runs throughout the guidelines, and in places the terms are used 
interchangeably. While step two does take into account the fact that the harms of 
revenge porn are not limited to distress, step one restricts the intent encompassed 
under high culpability to conduct intended to cause distress. As the psychological 
literature reveals, the object of revenge pursuits is not always primarily to cause 
distress; indeed, this may well be a secondary or oblique intent. Section 33(8) of 
the Act states that: 
a person charged with an offence under this section is not to be taken 
to have distributed a photograph or film with the intention of causing 
distress merely because that was a natural and probable consequence 
of the disclosure.
While possibly present to prevent the mens rea of the offence being diluted to 
mere recklessness, circumstances in which the offender does indeed intend 
principally to cause the victim harm – such as forwarding a private sexual image 
to her boss, with the intent of having her dismissed – either may not be caught by 
the offence or, at sentencing, will still not be regarded as possessing a high degree 
of culpability, since distress is not the direct intent.  However, Gillespie, whilst 
noting the uncertainty of the wording within the section, suggests that it is more 
likely to relate to ‘legitimate disclosures’ that, whilst could result in ‘distress’ 
should not be captured by the act.98A third question of concern regarding step 2 
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is how ‘distress’ might be measured for sentencing purposes. What evidence 
would need to be presented, and by whom? And is it realistic to presume that 
judges will agree that the level of harm constitutes Category 1 (‘serious types of 
harm’), when the defendant is considered to have a low degree of culpability?
The effect of public discourse and legislative focus operates to minimise 
the gendered nature of the harms that result from revenge pornography, and the 
terminology used throughout the CPS guidelines, draft sentencing guidelines and 
parliamentary debates signals a failure to ‘appreciate the scale of the problem’.99  
Whilst the positives in not being overly prescriptive in outlining a number of 
specific harms or scenarios are acknowledged (therefore not overly restrictive), 
the guidelines also assume that those using them will be able to consider and 
understand the nature and impact of the harms caused to victims and be able to 
adequately judge the level of harm and, indeed, ‘distress’. It is notable that the 
example scenario provided in the guidelines (Case Study C)100 is precisely the 
paradigmatic revenge pornography case we outlined in the introduction. Thus, we 
are left with a sense that the facts of a case are likely to be ‘measured up’ against 
this paradigmatic scenario. With that said, if being overly prescriptive was really 
an issue surely this would be equally true in the sentencing guidelines for rape. 
Ultimately, both the Section 33 offence and the sentencing guidelines remain 
shackled primarily to punishing revenge motivations rather than acknowledging 
and remedying harms caused to victims. Until this is appreciated in prosecution 
and sentencing policy, and the offence itself is reformed to combat this, there will 
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be limited success in resolving the deep-seated cultural issues associated with 
violence against women that underpin disclosure of private sexual images.  
Conclusion
The House of Lords Communication Committee, which reports on social media 
offences, recommended that disclosure of private sexual images was already well-
covered by existing ‘private laws’101 previously discussed within this article. 
Therefore, the only justification for the new offence is that it allows a victim to take 
retributive action and report, with the express goal of punishing for wrongdoing. 
Criminal justice intervention does not resolve any of the harms suffered by victims, 
given that the intervention provides no take-down solution of images automatically 
proffered in response to a successful prosecution, nor the ability to seek 
compensatory measures for, as an example, employment lost as a result of 
reputational damage. Practically, these are measures that would provide some 
redress to the victim of revenge pornography. The new offence predominantly 
focuses on the motivation behind the offence rather than the harm it causes the 
victim. The pursuit of revenge, it seems, is still as ripe a target for criminal-legal 
suppression now via Section 33, as it was then for crimes of passion. While the 
letter of the law makes no reference to revenge, for Section 33(b) to be proven it is 
likely to be difficult for a prosecution to avoid reference to the victim’s actions. 
This exposes the problem at the heart of the offence. Despite its attempts to 
explicitly avoid ‘revenge pornography’, the specific intent requirement invites 
discussion of revenge motivations and precipitating factors for them in by the back 
door. We agree, however, with Gillespie that a strict liability offence is going too 
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far, and thus, one further recommendation would be the removal of the specific 
intent requirement and instead a reliance on Section 8 Criminal Justice Act 1967, 
which refers to intent being determined 'by reference to all the evidence'.102 
However, one caveat we would suggest would be that such evidence should not 
include the victim’s sexual history and instead redirect focus on the effects of the 
disclosure on the victim (who should be permitted anonymity). Further, whilst there 
may be no place for a categorical approach in a reformed offence in terms of 'harms', 
perhaps the sentencing guidelines, had more care been taken, could offer greater 
acknowledgement of the harms as guidance and more solutions to the real harms 
associated with Section 33 offences, and address the same (take down orders, 
anonymity, financial redress to the victim (loss of job), restriction of victims sexual 
history). There are currently no reported cases under Section 33 in England and 
Wales. Thus, it is difficult to tell to what extent the cross-examination of the 
victim’s behaviour impact on the sentence imposed or how the question of 
revenge is discussed in court. With this said, revenge dominates legal, policy and 
media discourse on revenge pornography that operates to redirect debate and 
legislative responses away from recognised acts of violence against women and 
towards a condemnation of female sexuality. 
It is particularly disappointing to see that the question of anonymity was 
sidestepped in discussion of reform of the law, and we echo McGlynn and 
Rackley103 in recommending that this should be a primary consideration for 
legislators. In addition, very recently, the Ministry of Justice rejected calls to ban 
cross-examining victims on their sexual history in cases of rape, even if only in 
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exceptional circumstances.104 We would recommend that CPS guidance on Section 
33 should be amended to not only remove any mention of ‘revenge pornography’, 
but in addition, should make clear that defence lawyers should not ordinarily cross-
examine victims or, indeed, the perpetrator about their sexual history. While we 
believe that a high threshold for proving intention should be maintained, and do not 
recommend following the Scottish model, explicitly ruling it out would go some 
way to reducing secondary victimisation, and redirect the jury’s attention squarely 
on the perpetrator’s actions.
The paradigmatic narrative of revenge pornography looms large over the 
policy, legal and tabloid reporting of the offence, and as we have shown, relies on 
providing context for the act of revenge that either aims to mitigate the harm the 
victim suffered, or implicitly justify the ‘need’ for revenge as a recourse to infidelity 
or perceived wrongdoing on the part of the victim. However, the wider question 
this article has posed is whether revenge pornography, and the desire to criminalise 
it, would exist as a cultural phenomenon were women’s sexual agency not 
considered a provocation deserving of revenge, or the basis for their condemnation. 
Merely criminalising intention to cause distress in revenge pornography as though 
it is a ‘natural’ and universal urge to be suppressed, just as was the case in ‘crimes 
of passion’, does little to overturn these heavily gendered dynamics and stereotypes, 
and instead reinforces and repeats age-old heteropatriarchal scripts that demand the 
sexual deviations of women, ultimately, cannot go unpunished.
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